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INTRODUCTION
Increased requirements for safety and efficiency as well as increased
availability of reliable and inexpensive computer technology have resulted
in a trend of more and more computers being employed in flight management.
However, this trend by no means indicates that human operators will
disappear from aircraft cockpits. Instead, it means that the roles of the
pilot, copilot, and flight engineer will evolve to include increased
responsibilities for monitoring and supervising the various computer-based
systems employed in the aircraft.
While this assessment of the future roles of the members of the flight
crew is fairly easy to accept, it is certainly not straightforward to decide
how various flight tasks should be allocated among humans and computers.
Further, it is not clear how humans and computers should communicate
regarding the process by which their tasks are performed and the products
that result. This report discusses progress of a research program whose
overall objectives include providing at least partial answers to some of the
questions surrounding these issues.
The following two sections discuss two project areas which are
currently being pursued in this program of research: 1) the intelligent
cockpit and 2) studies of human problem solving. The first area involves an
investigation of the use of advanced software engineering methods (e.g.,
from artificial intelligence) to aid aircraft crews in procedure selection
and execution. The second area is focused on human problem solving in
dynamic environments, particularly in terms of identification of rule-based
models and alternative approaches to training and aiding. Both of these
efforts are producing results that are planned to be tested further in the
Center's evolving full-scope flight simulation facility. Progress on
developing this facility is discussed in the section on the intelligent
cockpit.
THE INTELLIGENT COCKPIT
Design goals for the intelligent aid are in the following section.
A review of progress in developing the DCS flight simulator is in the
second section.
GOALS FOR ANALYSIS OF DATA IN THE INTELLIGENT COCKPIT PROGRAM
The Problem
The data are a large, rich state vector of the aircraft. The
intelligent aid is to monitor this data to watch for pilot checklist
error and unsafe conditions either present or future.
The current approach to monitoring has been to divide the flight
into phases according to rules that examine the data past and present.
It is possible to be more specific about a phase than about the whole
flight. Thus, it is possible to apply pre-programmed checks as
appropriate to that phase. While this approach has merits, there are
design limits to what can be preprogrammed. In other words, this
approach works only for the situations the designer anticipates. In
particular, this approach can be made to look quite good in a controlled
experiment where the intelligent aid has been programmed to aid on those
situations the pilot will encounter. Our approach to demonstrating
intelligent aid concepts is to build something that at face value will
handle a wide variety of situations. If, due to complexity, a complete
aid cannot be constructed, we would prefer an in-depth aid for a
particular problem (e.g., electrical malfunctions). We reject an aid
that is able to catch a few problems of all kinds but which appears
inadequate for complete coverage.
External Goals
The external goals are the visible product that an observer or pilot
would see when the program is running. The following are planned.
1. The program will drive two displays. The first will be the
experimenter - system designer display. It will be used for
program debugging, etc. The second will be a display for the
pilot. It will be created even if there is no pilot to observe
it (e.g., off line simulator data). This generality will allow
the aid to be incorporated into the DC8 flight simulator without
substantial reworking. It will also allow subjective pilot
evaluation before being placed in the simulator.
2. The pilot's display will feature the following. Procedures will
automatically be selected for display by the aid. When the aid
detects an error, the procedure display will be changed, perhaps
by highlighting.
3. The display will alert the pilot to aircraft operation outside
the normal regime at the present time and in the future.
Internal Goals
The internal goals describe how the program is organized. Some of
these supplement the external goals; some are not apparent from that
vantage point.
1. The program will understand the procedure in terms of a model of
the aircraft. This model will be used to predict the future
states of the aircraft. The program will understand the effect
of procedural errors, not just know how to detect them as was
the case in the earlier version of the program.
2. To the maximum extent possible, the program will generally apply
to all commercial transport aircraft. This will facilitate
changing from NASA's B727 to our DCS.
3. Existing scripts will be enhanced and will represent more than a
procedure checklist. The script will be active whenever the
aircraft is in the appropriate state. While the aircraft is in
the script, constraints on safe flight will be constantly
monitored.
4. The program's goal will be to avoid aborting the flight plan.
This goal is made up of a number of subgoals which are by
aircraft subsystem. For example, to avoid aborting the flight
plan, the following failures must be avoided
propulsion failure
aerodynamic failures
hydraulic failures
etc.
Each of these areas can in turn be broken down into finer
problems
propulsion failure
over stress engines
engine ice up
engine stall
engine oil pressure
engine explosion and airframe/airfoil damage
etc.
To be systematic, it would be important to enumerate as many
forms of failures as possible. Organizing them by subsystems
would tend to keep the designer from missing a failure mode.
To restrict the aid program to a manageable size, it may be
necessary to aid only a subset of the potential failures (e.g.,
only electrical problems). This would, however, demonstrate the
approach's generality, and it would be clear how to generalize
to the entire aircraft.
5. The program will be coded as a rule-based system in LISP. As we
have stated before, the problem of intelligent aiding is
principally a symbolic problem. In addition, the debugging
tools for LISP are far superior to those of other languages.
Also, there is a practical advantage to the use of LISP. If the
simulator code or the intelligent aid should end up consuming
too much of the VAX's capability, it should be possible to move
the LISP aid code to a LISP machine. This should be
considerably cheaper than other VAX.
6. The program must make some predictions about the aircraft's
future. This is necessary to check for safe, future states.
Representing and manipulating the passage of time is a
recognized problem in artificial intelligence. Hopefully, some
contribution can be made to this area.
Conclusion
The proposed new aid will have an improved understanding of the
aircraft and consequently the ability to alert the pilot to present and
future dangers. The aid will also be useable on both the B727 and the
DCS.
SIMULATOR DEVELOPMENT
Simulator Hardware
Most of the switches and controls (overhead panels and flight
controls) have wires connected that go outside the cockpit and are
waiting to be connected to the A/D converter. A few engine controls and
the elevator controls must have sensors designed and installed before
being wired.
All of the CRT displays have been mounted in the flight deck. A
cowling must be added to enclose one of the CRT's forward of the
pedestal. Both this cowling and a force feel system for the control yoke
are being designed and built in the GTRI shop. The custom keyboards have
been designed and are currently being fabricated. A force feel system
for the pedals is installed and undergoing final adjustment.
Simulation Software
The simulation software currently supports high fidelity engines,
flight dynamics, radio navigation and an autopilot. Hydraulic,
electrical, and fuel systems are not being simulated in any but the most
elementary ways in this version of the simulator. The remaining work on
the simulation software is to integrate it with the display software and
to modify the takeoff routines to use flight dynamics. Some minor
modifications (coefficient changes and term changes) are being made to
the flight dynamics to make it perform as a commercial transport.
Display Software
There are three displays to be produced for in the simulator: the
flight instruments, the engine status, and the navigation/autopilot/
communication display. The engine status display is being programmed
now; it is fairly simple. The navigation/autopilot/communication display
specifications have been worked out and will be programmed after the
engine display is completed.
The flight instrument display is by far the most complicated
display. The original plans were to use an Apple II to drive the color
displays. It appears this will not work because the Apple is not fast
enough. The following simple analysis shows how this was determined.
The ADI must be updated frequently; at a minimum, updating this display
requires drawing of 11 or 12 lines. Timing estimates show the Apple
(using Pascal) can erase an old line and draw a new line in .02 +
.0002*pixels seconds. Thus, the ADI graphics can be redrawn about once
every .250 seconds. In practice, the Apple II will be much slower than
this, since it would have to make computations, receive VAX input, and
display all of the flight instruments, not just the ADI. Thus, a 4 Hz
ADI bandwidth is quite optimistic with regard to Apple II capabilities,
but it is insufficient with respect to the pilot's needs. It is our
understanding that a 6 to 8 Hz bandwidth is necessary for realistic
control.
While it may well be possible to write an assembly language program
to make the Apple perform as desired, it would be expensive from a labor
standpoint. Consequently, alternative graphics devices are being
investigated. Currently, the specifications for this graphics device are
that it have a high speed, parallel interface to the VAX and a display
list. The parallel interface is necessary to update the display quickly.
A display list is necessary so that all the dynamic elements on the
screen can be changed in real-time.
It has also become apparent that seven more terminal ports will be
necessary to drive the simulator displays. Three of these ports will be
for output, three for input, and at least one will be needed by the
experimenter to control the simulation. We would prefer to add more
ports rather than take away from those we already have. Fortunately,
ports cost only $200 each in groups of sixteen.
HUMAN PROBLEM SOLVING
As noted in the Introduction, research in this area is focusing on:
1) identification of rule-based models and, 2) alternative approaches to
training and aiding. Both of these efforts are oriented toward human
problem solving in dynamic environments including aviation and process
control.
Mike Lewis, in conjunction with his Ph.D. thesis, is pursuing
identification of rule-based models. The goal is to lessen the usual
substantial subjectivity in the formulation of rule-based models by
developing and testing algorithmic approaches. In this report, Mike
discusses his use of such approaches for analysis of the CDTI data of Ev
Palmer and his colleagues.
During the past three years, a portion of the efforts in problem
solving have been focused on process control. Using a simulation called
PLANT, Nancy Morris investigated the effects of types of knowledge on
human performance. Annette Knaeuper developed a rule-based model of
human problem solving in PLANT. In comparing the behavior of this model
with that of humans, Annette found that humans often did not follow their
instructions, namely, PLANT operating procedures. This led to the idea
of using the rule-based model for online aiding and training of
operators. Annette and Nancy performed an initial empirical evaluation
of this concept, the results of which are discussed in this report.
IDENTIFICATION OF RULE-BASED MODELS
Charles M. Lewis
INTRODUCTION
Researchers investigating pilots using cockpit displays of traffic
information (CDTI) (Palmer et al., 1980 and Smith et al., 1982) have found
choice of control action to depend upon individual differences as well as
encounter or display characteristics. In the development of the CDTI it is
important that both generalized strategies shared by all pilots and
idiosyncratic choices of the few be understood. As the CDTI will likely be
used in conjunction with a collision avoidance system (CAS) it is important
to gauge the influence of the display on pilot maneuvers so that advisories
can be formed which are both consonant with pilot strategy and avoid
conflicts among strategies. The radar assisted collisions discussed by
Curry (1972) demonstrate the danger of introducing such technology without
consideration of operator strategies.
While established policy capturing methods exist for examining the
influence of variables on decisions, they fail to elucidate what the
influenced policy actually was. The present work employs pattern
generalization techniques to identify a production system of rules
capturing the consistencies in observed behavior. A production rule
consists of tofo parts, a set of conditions and an action. If the
conditions are satisfied the rule's action is performed. If conditions are
expressed using prepositional logic, descriptions are restricted to
attributes (global properties of an object). Measurements commonly used in
science such as height, weight, or velocity are of this type. In such
cases the conditional part of the rule defines a region of the attribute
space within which the rule is true (responses are of the type specified in
the action part of the rule). This representation proves convenient for
visualizing set theoretic relations among rules.
While this
 xformulation of pattern generalization is similar in
approach to discriminant analysis there are some important distinctions:
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1. A rule describes an enclosed region of the event space rather than
a partition dividing the space into two parts.
2. More than one rule may be needed to describe a response if regions
in which it occurs are separated.
3. Rules may vary both in generality (size of region) and selectivity
(accuracy of discrimination).
This report describes an application of pattern generalization to
identification of pilot strategies.
CDTI DATA
Data from an experiment by Palmer (1983) investigating the effects of
information quality and intruder characteristics in the use of a cockpit
display of traffic information instrument has been reanalyzed using pattern
generalization techniques.
In this experiment Sixteen pilots "flew" sixteen programmed encounters
under three display conditions. Pilots were instructed to maintain a
steady course, using the autopilot unless they received a threat advisory.
In response to the threat they were to maneuver to maintain a horizontal
separation of greater than 1.5 nm and a vertical separation in excess of
500 ft. They were advised that an appropriate strategy was to maneuver so
that the intruder would pass further away but in the same orientation at
the point of closest approach.
In the least informative condition the display portrayed the relative
positions of the ownship and the intruder along with tags showing their
altitudes. The predictive display provided ground referenced predictors
showing predicted positions of the ownship and intruder as well as a tag
showing the intruders projected altitude at time of closest approach. In
the third condition noise was introduced into the predictive display
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
In this analysis encounter variables, describing the physical
relationship between the intruder and ownship which the pilot is instructed
to control, were differentiated from experimental variables. Five
encounter variables were used. Four describe the relative positions of the
aircraft at their point of closest approach as projected at time of alarm.
The fifth measure, intruder vertical velocity, remains constant throughout
Page 3
the encounter,
hpass-horizontal passing position= behind, intercept, or infront.
hsep-prejected horizontal separations very near(0-.24nm), near(.24-lnm),
or far ( > Iran).
vcross-vertically crossing trajectories= nofyes.
vsep-prejected vertical separation= very near(0-140'), near(140-350'),
or far( > 350').
weloc-intruder vertical velocity= zero or non-zero.
Of the sixteen programmed encounters, encounters 7 and 8 which
introduce crossing angle between the aircraft as a variable were excluded.
Encounters 11-16 which involve abrupt changes in intruder course or
introduction of intruder in near proximity to ownship, invalidating
projections made at time of alarm, remain unanalyzed as in Palmer's (1983)
report.
Two non-encounter variables were considered, display type and pilot.
Display type in conjunction with the encounter variables describes the
stimuli under which a decision is made. Inclusion of pilot identification
in the generalization introduces individual differences.
RESPONSE VARIABLE
Pilots' responses were represented in terms of maneuvers toward or
away from the intruder along a dominant axis. The dominant axis was
determined by comparing the horizontal and vertical magnitudes of a
maneuver to the respective tolerances which the pilots had been instructed
to maintain. Five response classes result: no action, vertical-toward,
vertical-away, horizontal-toward, and horizontal-away.
PERFORMANCE MEASURES
Nonparametric measures of association tau-b, the ratio of between
groups sum of squares to total sum of squares, and PRE, the reduction in
error relative to assigning the modal response to all cases, provide
measures of rule performance which consider both coverage and
discrimination. Tau-b provides a nonparametric analog to a squared
correlation with values under .1 indicating a relatively weak association
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(corresponding to r < .30) and those over .5 a relatively strong one
(corresponding to r > .70). Using tauf single rules are evaluated by
comparing the distribution of response classes within the rule with that of
the remainder of the cases. This provides a measure (barring
intersections) of described variance contributed by that rule to its rule
set. Rule set performance may be evaluated relative to the situations in
which it applies or to the entire range of examples. When restricted to
applicable regions, tau may be interpreted as a measure of the extent to
which the rule set describes identified consistencies. When evaluated
relative to the entire space, an additional "response category" formed by
uncovered observations is required. In this case tau may be considered a
measure of rule set performance relative to arbitrarily chosen examples.
Aq ALGORITHM
A pattern generalization program, INDUCE 3 (Hoff, et al. 1983), was
obtained for use in rule identification. In this analysis only the VL1
(Aq) subprogram which identifies rules in prepositional logic was employed.
The Aq algorithm generates a set of putative rules which match a
particular positive example and exclude all negative examples. The rule
which matches the most additional positive examples is retained. At each
iteration sucessfully matched examples are removed from consideration. The
process terminates when all non contradictory positive examples have been
matched. Although previously matched examples cannot contribute to the
retention of rules, they become "blanks" in the space, which being neutral,
may become part of subsequent generalizations. The resulting rules may
overlap substantially. If "rectangular rules" were identified for figure
1, three rules would be found: Rule-l=(2,3,4,5), Rule-2=(2,3,4,6,7,8),
Rule-3=(l,3,7). As Rule-1 substantially describes this space with little
non redundant contribution from rules 2 or 3, a parsimonious description
may allow the smaller regions, 1,6,7, and 8 to go undescribed. Under other
circumstances collapsing across an explanatory variable to produce a more
general rule making occasional errors may be the choice dictated by
parsimony.
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EFFECTS OF NON-ENCOUNTER VARIABLES
The complete set of rules generalized using the Aq algorithm provides
an upper bound on the consistency with which the responses can be
associated with the explanatory variables employed. The contribution of a
variable may be examined by comparing performances between rule sets
generalized with and without that variable. While modest improvement will
be obtained from an additional variable based on an increase in degrees of
freedom, major improvements in description will mirror the "influence" of
that variable on pilot decisions. An index to the relative contribution of
an explanatory variable may be found by rank ordering rules by performance.
The relative performance for same sized sets of rules can then be compared
for rule sets of varying sizes.
A generalization based on encounter variables alone produced 230
correct matches with 154 errors resulting in tau-b=.18. If individual
differences among pilots are considered as well, correct matches rise to
324 with 60 errors and tau-b=.61. Less improvement is found in the
generalization based on encounter variables and display types: correct
matches=254, errors=130r tau-b=.27. If display type and individual
differences are entered into the generalization simultaneously only one
error occurs yielding a tau-b of .99.
VARIABLES No. Rules Hits FAS Tau-b PRE
ENCOUNTER
ENCOUNTER H
ENCOUNTER H
ENCOUNTER H
H DISPLAY
I- PILOT
I- PILOT + DISPLAY
20
42
85
114
230
254
324
383
154
130
60
1
.18
.27
.61
.99
.38
.48
.76
.99
Considering performance as a function of the number of rules reveals
the same ordering of effects as found for the complete rule sets. The
steeper slope of the generalization including individual differences and
display type indicates the importance of their interaction in describing
control strategy. Individual differences appear the stronger of the
factors, halving the number of errors found in a generalization based on
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encounter variables alone. Pilots appear to develop individualized
strategies which are influenced in similar ways by the type of display
being used. Individual differences in the adaptation of control strategy
to display, however/ appear necessary to account for pilot behavior in
detail.
IDENTIFICATION OF STRATEGIES
Examining the effects of non-encounter variables by comparing the
performance of complete rule sets relies on the Aq algorithm's capability
of finding a set of rules embodying whatever consistencies are present in
the data. In this usage, ability to phrase noncontradictory rules is more
crucial than their generality. When used to identify strategies, however,
the generality and performance of particular rules or families of rules
becomes of primary importance.
General strategies tend to be somewhat broader than absolute
noncontradiction requires. Particular pilots, displays, and encounters
often demonstrate slight, variations on more basic strategies. In
extracting strategies from a rule set it is necessary to consider a number
of explicit trade-offs:
1. Discrimination- The strategy should make few false matches
2. Generality- The strategy should apply to many of the examples
3. Uniqueness- Multiple identified strategies should not match the
same examples
4. Coverage- Selected strategies should cover a substantial portion
of the examples
5. Parsimony- Only a small number of strategies should be identified
In spatial terms these criteria call for partitioning a large part of
the attribute space (coverage) into a small number (parsimony) of large
(generality), homogeneous (discrimination), non-intersecting (uniqueness)
regions. These goals are often conflicting. As the size of regions (and
concomitantly coverage of the rule set) increases, so does the likelihood
of matching negative examples or intersecting neighboring regions.
Identification of strategies requires selection of a subset of
representative rules which "best" meet these criteria.
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While the appropriate quantification of these criteria is not apparent
it is not necessary for a rough identification of major strategies.
Selection of a subset of rules from major regions of homogeneity requires
only that the analyst simultaneously consider rule performance and region.
Once selected, the performance of the reduced rule set can be evaluated and
its usefulness as an abstraction of major consistencies in the observations
appraised. Other possible selections do not invalidate this choice but
merely vary the fineness of detail in exchanging generality for
discrimination or parsimony for coverage. The resulting rule sets provide
production system models of the observed behaviors. Conditions under which
consistent responding failed to occur can be identified as well.
RULE TREES
Since rules may be refinements of one another or otherwise share
observations it is necessary to consider rule sets in a way making their
redundancy explicit. This is facilitated by representing rules in trees in
which successors are subsets of their predecessors. Rules below a selected
rule then describe subregions of that rule while the rule, itself,
demarcates a subregion of the rules above it. Rules which are not subsets
of any other rule form roots.
Well developed tree structures are typical of major strategies. Roots
are found in generalizations collapsed across non-encounter variables while
more specific generalizations provide refinements and variations on this
basic theme attributable to particular pilots, displays, and encounters.
Solitary roots by contrast tend to delimit smaller, less populous regions
of the attribute space.
Rules from all generalizations, with tau > .01-.02 to exclude those
covering only two or three events, were assembled into rule sets for each
control action. Trees were then generated for each response type. A rule
was considered a subset if:
1. proper subset- its conditions were a subset of its predecessor's
2. phenotypic subset- all events covered were also covered by its
predecessor
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3. intersecting subset- 90% of events covered were also covered by
its predecessor
While representing rules within trees clusters those most closely
associated, even roots may share substantial numbers of observations in
common. In selecting rules depicting general strategies it is also
necessary to consider the uniqueness of these rules which are not quite so
closely related. This overlap can be conveniently expressed in an
intersection matrix whose entries are the number of common observations for
the rules appearing in its indices. Although less complete in its
depiction than the rule tree which represents relations directly in the
attribute space, the intersection matrix provides a convenient means for
representing more isolated regions. In identifying major strategies the
analyst may use the structural information provided by rule trees along
with the more complete picture of intersections supplied by the matrix to
choose rules from among branches, between trees, and among roots. This
task will generally prove less formidable than it sounds since a major
strategy will usually spawn a tree with a good representative(s) near its
root while isolated roots typically have low coverage and may be
disregarded.
RESULTS
A set of 9 rules were selected from the generalizations based on rule
trees and intersection matrices. The selected rule set covers 44% of the
sampled event space with 143 correct matches and 24 errors yielding PRE=.77
and tau=.61. When performance is considered relative to the entire event
space these figures become: correct matches=213 errors=171 with PRE=.32
and tau=.27.
Two rules describe conditions for taking no action, three for turning
vertically away, and four for turning horizontally toward. Turning
vertically toward the intruder occurred very rarely (12 out of 384
encounters) and so was not modeled. The horizontal away response
accounting for 70 of the 384 encounters also was not represented. Although
73% of these occurrences are successfully described by a set of 29
horizontal-away rules with only 21 errors, these rules have uniformally
small coverage and low overlap. Over half of the horizontal-away rules
were restricted to groups of five or fewer pilots indicating the
idiosyncratic (or coincidental) nature of this response choice. The
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overall inconsistency in the choice of this response is revealed in the
rule trees for horizontal-away where 27 of 29 rules stand alone if a 90%
inclusion criterion is applied. To consider pilot strategy it is necessary
to examine the rules, themselves, in greater detail. This will be done for
each response class.
NO ACTION
Rule No. 1
[Pilot=7,8,9,10,ll,12,13,14,15,16] & [Horizontal passing position=intercepting or in front]
& [Projected horizontal separation=far]
correct matches=22, errors=7, PRE=.09, tau-b=.07
Rule No. 2
[Pilot=3,4,7,8,ll,14,15,16] & [Projected horizontal separation=far] &
[Vertical crossover=true]
correct matches=18, errors=6, PRE=.07, tau-b=.05
RULE SET SUMMARY FOR NO-ACTION
correct matches=35, errors=ll, PRE=.14, tau-b=.ll
The essential condition for eliciting no response appears to be a
large projected horizontal separation. Thirty of the 36 rules found for
no-response were refinements of this condition, [Projected horizontal
separation=far]. Standing alone this condition produces 43 correct matches
with 52 errors. The two rules selected miss 8 of these matches but result
in 41 fewer errors.
Both individual differences and other aspects of the encounters appear
responsible for the increase in selectivity. In the first rule, encounters
in which the intruder would pass behind are excluded. This finding is
consistent with (O'Connor et.al., 1980) and findings in relation to the
horizontal-toward response in this study, that pilots tend to maneuver in a
way to cause intruders to pass in front. Individual differences have an
equally clear influence. Pilots 7,8,11,14,15,and 16 appear in both of the
selected rules. If [Projected horizontal separation=far] is constrained to
this group of pilots, correct matches are reduced by only 44% while errors
decline by 79%. If the selected rules were restricted to these pilots,
selectivity again improves with correct matches declining from 35 to 22 and
errors from 11 to 5.
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While pilots made no response on only 48 out of the 384 encounters,
patterns are found for this choice. A relatively small group (6-8) of
pilots account for almost all occasions on which a constant course was
maintained. This choice was made appropriately for large horizontal
separations but failed to occur when the major separation was vertical or
the intruder was oriented to pass behind.
VERTICAL MAY
Rule No. 3
[Pilot=2,6,7,8,10,11,12,15] & [Projected vertical separation=near] &
[Vertical velocity=zero]
correct matches=43, errors=3, tau-b=.09
Rule No. 4
[Pilot=6,7,ll,13,16] & [Projected horizontal separation=near] &
[Projected vertical separation=very near or near] &
[Vertical velocity=zero]
correct matches=27, errors=l, tau-b=.06
Rule No. 5
[Display=no predictor] & [Vertical velocity=zero]
correct matches=27, errors=5, tau-b=.05
RULE SET SUMMARY FOR VERTICAL-SWAY
correct matches=62, errors=7, tau-b=.12
Rules for the vertical away response are contained within the portion
of the space in which the intruder is approaching at a constant altitude.
Seventy-six of 134 encounters responded to with a vertical-away response
were of this type. While 34 additional encounters are covered by 13 more
rules in which this condition is not explicitly expressed, their
observations fall largely within the constant altitude region. The failure
to find strong rules covering the 54 encounters in which the intruder
changed altitude indicates an inconsistent usage of the vertical-away
response under these conditions. Rules 3 and 4 contain proximity
conditions and apply to all displays. In rule 5 both proximity and
individual differences are dropped. In the absence of predicted separation
pilots chose a vertical away response when confronted with an intruder at
constant velocity regardless of the actual threat. Examination of these
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rules indicates that, for these encounters, projected proximity information
influenced the decision to respond but not the response chosen. Pilots'
choice of the vertical-away response appears limited to the constant
altitude intruder although a strategy of increasing vertical separation
would apply to vertically moving intruders as well. The presence of
predicted altitudes does not appear to influence this decision. While the
vertical-away response was the modal response in this study its association
with a clearly discriminable form of separation information rather than
projected separations provided by the predictor displays may indicate some
difficulties in the use of this information to guide control actions.
HORIZONTAL TOWARD
Rule No. 6
[Pilot=7,11,12,14] & [Display=no predictor or predictor] &
[Projected horizontal separation=very near or near] &
[Vertical crossover=no] & [Vertical velocity=not zero]
correct matches=14, errors=0, PRE=.06, tau-b=.03
Rule No. 7
[Pilot=6,ll,12,14] & [Projected horizontal separation=near] &
[Projected vertical separation=far] & [Vertical velocity=not zero]
correct matches=9, errors=0, PRE=.04, tau-b=.02
Rule No. 8
[Pilot=4,5,ll,12,15] & [Projected horizontal separation=very near] &
[Vertical velocity=not zero]
correct matches=19, errors=6, PRE=.07, tau-b=.03
Rule No. 9
[Pilot NE 5,6,10] & [Display=no predictor] & [Passing position=intercept or in front]
& [Projected horizontal separation=near] & [Vertical velocity=not zero]
correct matches=15, errors=0, PRE=.06, tau-b=.04
RULE SET SUMMARY FOR HORIZONTAL-TCWARD
correct matches=46, errors=6, PRE=.18, tau-b=.10
Rules for the horizontal-toward response are contained within the
complementary "changing intruder altitude" portion of the event space.
This factor rather than proximity or relative orientation appears crucial
in the choice between horizontal and vertical responding. While the
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vertical-away response was chosen consistently throughout the constant
altitude region, the choice of the horizontal-toward response is less
monolithic. As noted in the discussion of "no-response", this choice
occurs almost exclusively (98%) in this region. Similarly 83% of the
vertical-toward, 43% of the vertical-away, and 93% of the horizontal-away
responses occur in encounters in which the intruder is changing altitude.
Rules 6, 7, and 8 are refinements based on individual differences of a
strategy of turning toward intruders who are laterally close and changing
altitudes:
[Projected horizontal separation=very near or near] &
[Vertical velocity=not zero]
correct matches=85, errors=107, PRE>=.12, tau-b=.05
The poor performance of the rule expressed in this general way indicates
this strategy is followed by only a small group of pilots. The improved
selectivity of rules 6 and 7 is attributable primarily to pilots 11, 12,
and 14. The general rule restricted to these pilots:
[Pilot=li;i2,14] & [Projected horizontal separation=very near or near]
& [Vertical velocity=not zero]
correct matches=28, errors=8, PRE>=.08, tau-b=.04
accounts for 75% of the encounters covered by rules 6 and 7 and represents
a major improvement in selectivity over its unrestricted form. Rule 8,
another refinement of the general strategy which restricts the rule to
intruders at the closest proximity, is followed by a larger group of
pilots. None of these rules shares as many as 60% of its observations with
the rule embodying the recommended strategy for a horizontal-toward
response:
1. There is a threat
2. Maneuvering horizontally toward the intruder will maintain the
aircrafts1 relative horizontal positions and increase horizontal
separation at point of closest approach.
[Passing position=intercept or in front] &
& [Projected horizontal separation=very near or near]
correct matches=65, errors=79, PR&=.02, tau-b=.03
Rule 9, by contrast, is a refinement of the recommended strategy fitting
most pilots using the display without a predictor.
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DISCUSSION
Within the range of encounters examined, the vertical movement of the
intruder appears the most crucial factor in determining the pilot's
dominant response. Under conditions in which the intruder approached at a
constant altitude pilots under all displays, with few individual
differences, and with little regard to the degree of threat, maneuvered
vertically away. This strategy follows the principle of least effort in
limiting the decision to a single dimension (vertical velocity) and
producing a response which increases separation at point of closest
approach under all conditions. While ensuring success at the pilots'
primary task of avoidance, this strategy may run counter to the secondary
task of maintaining course in the face of nonthreatening encounters. This
shortcoming is highlighted by noting that of 48 occasions on which the
pilot did not maneuver only one occurred under these conditions.
When the intruder was changing altitude the vertical response
dimension was largely ignored accounting for the dominant response on only
24% of such occasions. As in previous studies (Palmer et al. 1981, Ellis
and Palmer 1982, Smith et al. 1982,1984) horizontal-toward were preferred
to horizontal-away responses. Palmer et al. 1981 have attributed this
tendency to the pilots' desire to maintain visual contact with the intruder
while Ellis and Palmer (1982) have suggested they desire, instead, to
minimize the time to resolution of the conflict by passing behind the
intruder. Regardless of the motivation, this effect is found consistently
in CDTI studies and should be considered in assessing the usefulness of
such displays. Smith et al. shed additional light on this preference,
finding that encounters rated as less threatening showed a stronger
turning-toward tendency. Rules identified for the horizontal-toward
response support this view showing a general preference for the
horizontal-toward response while using predictor displays which allowed a
clear view of conflict resolution but limiting the response to the more
conservative recommended strategy when the display lacked predictors.
As found in earlier studies (Smith et al., Palmer et al., Ellis and
Palmer) large individual differences were noted among pilot's strategies.
The most nearly universal decision was the choice of the vertical-away
maneuver under conditions in which it unambiguously increased separation.
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The rules identified suggest that vertical information may not be
presented in the most useful manner. None of the nine selected rules
contain any reference to this relation although it contributes as much to
achieved separation and collision avoidance as the horizontal dimension.
This neglect is further reflected in the pilots' overall preference for
horizontal maneuvers. Smith et al. have suggested the preference for
horizontal responses may be due to FAA regulations, comfort, safety or fuel
conservation but the absence of vertical information from decision rules
suggest the bias may more likely be due to the superior display of
horizontal traffic information.
The finding that pilots using predictive CDTI displays were more
likely to proceed with conflict resolution by turning toward the intruder
than following the recommended strategy reinforces concerns aired by Palmer
et al. (1981), Lester and Quan (1983) and others that CDTI in some
instances may actually make collisions more likely. Pilots, themselves,
are not immune to this fear. The October 28, 1984 New York Times observes
that, "The Airline Pilots Association has been especially insistent that
the devices must ultimately be able to recommend a horizontal right turn or
left turn maneuver in addition to a vertical maneuver." Earlier analysis of
this data (Palmer 1983) indicates that the noiseless predictor display led
to fewer positive CAS advisories and smaller maneuver magnitudes while the
predictorless display resulted in smaller achieved separations and less
frequent agreement with the recommended strategy. The present
investigation suggests that the superiority in performance on the predictor
displays results from improvements in execution rather than fundamental
shifts in strategy. FOr one group of pilots, in fact, consistent violation
of the recommended strategy was linked with the use of the noiseless
predictor display. While the most widely employed strategy observed was
the vertical away response to a constant altitude intruder, vertical
responses were generally avoided under other conditions. Since projected
altitudes at closest point of approach provide information unavailable from
rapidly updating data tags, the failure to find a related consistency in
pilots' responses suggests some difficulty in abstracting or using this
more detailed altitude information as it is presented.
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ABSTRACT
This research addressed the feasibility of adapting an
existing rule-based system as an online "coach" for controlling
PLANT, a simulation of a generic process plant. KARL, a
rule-based model capable of controlling PLANT, was adapted to
provided three types of information to subjects: 1) situation
assessment (i.e., which operational procedure, if any, was
applicable for a given situation); 2) guidance in following
procedures (i.e., feedback whenever subjects' actions were
inconsistent with available procedures); 3) performance feedback
(based upon changes in the system's stability). Subjects
received this information online while controlling PLANT.
Compared to subjects in an earlier experiment who controlled
PLANT without the benefit of the coach, these subjects maintained
a generally more stable system, scored higher on a
paper-and-pencil test of system knowledge, and were more
successful in diagnosing an unfamiliar failure of the PLANT
safety system. Careful analysis of these results in light of
previous research with PLANT indicated that the reasons for these
differences were not as straightforward as they might appear.
This experiment is viewed as illustrating potential benefits and
subtleties of using a rule-based model as an online coach.
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INTRODUCTION
As systems increase in complexity, the question of how
persons should be trained to operate them becomes more important.
The amount of training required for someone to become proficient
at controlling a complex system may be quite extensive, and it is
necessary to consider a number of issues when developing such a
training program. These issues include the content and format of
instructional material and the structure of the program. Because
of inherent human limitations, it may also be necessary to
consider provision of some kind of performance aid, in addition
to appropriate training.
Many reports are available which directly or indirectly
address issues relevant to training (Morris & Rouse, 1984.b).
Some are directed at obtaining an understanding of how people
solve problems, either in the laboratory or in contact with an
actual system. Others investigate the effects of various
training approaches upon performance. Often there is a
discussion of the human's "mental model" of the system being
controlled (Rouse & Morris, 1984).
One study in particular served as a basis for the present
research. Morris investigated the effects of different types of
instruction upon subjects' ability to control PLANT, a
computer-based simulation of a generic fluid production process
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(Morris, 1983; Morris & Rouse, 1984a). The PLANT operator's
task is to supervise the flow of fluid through a series of tanks
interconnected by valves so as to maximize production. This may
be done by opening and/or closing valves and adjusting input and
output, via commands entered at the terminal keyboard. A number
of failures may occur in PLANT, so there are several diagnostic
and repair commands available as well.
The primary comparison in Morris1 research was between two
different types of instruction: 1) operational procedures, and
2) a description of dynamic principles and functional
relationships in PLANT. Four groups of subjects were compared,
distinguished on the basis of the combination of written
instructional materials they received (i.e., principles,
procedures, neither principles nor procedures, or both principles
and procedures). Instruction was found to have no effect upon
subjects' achievement of the overall goal of production, in that
there were no differences between groups with respect to this
measure. However, those groups receiving procedures were found
to control the PLANT in a more stable manner, even though all
groups had been told to maintain stability.
An interesting aspect of this research was an investigation
of subjects' ability to deal with two unfamiliar failures: a
tank rupture, and failure of the PLANT safety system. (The
failures were unfamiliar in that, although subjects knew they
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could occur, they had not experienced them before.) Almost all
subjects repaired the tank rupture; however, only half of the
subjects in each group successfully diagnosed the safety system
failure. This was surprising, because subjects with an
understanding of the functioning of the system (as described in
the principles) should have been better able to make that
diagnosis .
As a result of these findings, it was suggested that one of
the reasons a knowledge of principles failed to help many
subjects deal with the unfamiliar failure was that those people
did not realize that they were in an unusual situation, and thus
did not realize that they should use their knowledge. In other
words, they failed to make an accurate assessment of the
situation. This notion was indirectly supported by the fact that
those persons who did repair the unfamiliar safety system failure
also maintained a more stable system in general; since the
effect of the safety system failure was to make the PLANT appear
more unstable, maintaining a stable system may have enabled
subjects to detect the presence of an unusual situation more
readily.
Some useful insights into subjects' behavior were gained by
comparing their performance to that of KARL (Knowledgeable
Application of Rule-based L_ogic), a model capable of controlling
PLANT (Knaeuper, 1983; Knaeuper & Rouse, 1984). KARL is a
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rule-based model patterned after a general model of human problem
solving proposed by Rouse (1983), which suggests that problem
solving is accomplished in three stages: 1) recognition and
classification, 2) planning, and 3) execution and monitoring.
These three stages essentially define KARL's structure. When
controlling PLANT, KARL accesses a knowledge base consisting
basically of information contained in written information
available to subjects (i.e., operational heuristics and
procedures, and information about dynamic principles and
functional relationships).
When the performance of subjects and KARL was compared, it
was noted that KARL consistently achieved higher production and
maintained a more stable system than did subjects. It was also
interesting to examine differences in the courses of action
chosen by subjects and KARL in solving problems in PLANT.
Basically, two rather systematic differences were found. First,
the levels of system input and output chosen by subjects were not
as high as those chosen by KARL (and suggested by procedures);
subjects were more conservative in this respect. Second, KARL
adjusted input and output much more frequently than did subjects;
this reflected heuristics within KARL which were directed at
maximizing production, which were not a part of operational
procedures.
Considering some of the apparent difficulties experienced by
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subjects in making an accurate situation assessment and following
procedures, and the benefits derived from using KARL as an
off-line analysis tool, an idea emerged. Why not make it
possible for KARL to analyze subjects' actions online and provide
advice, thus functioning as an online "coach"? It seemed that
such an approach could prove to be useful for both training and
aiding.*
DESCRIPTION OF THE COACH
In light of the factors noted above, the decision was made
to provide subjects with three types of information. In the
context of PLANT, this information was displayed on the terminal
near the area where normal operating messages were displayed.
The first type of information was related to situation
assessment. Specifically, a message informing the subject which
procedure was currently applicable was shown (e.g., "Procedure
5"). If no procedure applied, the following message was
displayed: "No procedure applicable; Normal tuning".
Subjects also received guidance in following procedures.
KARL monitored subjects' actions, and provided feedback if a
given action was inconsistent with the applicable procedure. For
* Of course, one could view this approach as simply a
special case of "expert systems". This issue is discussed later
in this paper.
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example, the following message might appear: "Your action
(cva,e)* is inconsistent with Procedure 5. Keep all valves open
until the system is stable again. Type 'y' for change." As may
be ascertained from the last portion of the message, subjects had
the option of overriding KARL or changing their actions to be
consistent with KARL's recommendations.
The third type of information supplied by KARL was
performance feedback, or information about the degree to which
subjects' actions were succeeding in remedying problems in the
system. This information was supplied because of the length of
time required for the consequences of actions to become manifest.
These messages were based upon changes in PLANT stability over a
period of 10 time units, and consisted of the following:
"Instability extreme", "Instability excessive", or "Instability
improving".
The process of enabling KARL to supply such messages was
relatively straightforward. However, when an attempt was made to
control PLANT with KARL as an assistant, a number of problems
became apparent. For example, KARL's advice as to what actions
should be taken was not always consistent with procedures. This
could be attributed to the nature of KARL's approach to PLANT.
* cva,e = close the valve between tanks a and e
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Although the information in the procedures was contained in
KARL's knowledge base, KARL also employed several heuristics when
controlling PLANT, which occasionally preempted the action
recommended in procedures.
Another problem was related to KARL's situation assessment.
During the course of PLANT operation, situations would
occasionally arise which were "borderline" conditions with
respect to the applicability of various procedures. KARL's
decisions as to which procedure applied were based upon fixed
values of state variables. In borderline situations, normal
fluctuations of these state variables caused KARL to change the
situation assessment message rather frequently (e.g., every other
time unit).
A third source of difficulty was KARL's "persistence" in
reporting actions which were inconsistent with procedures. The
PLANT operator was given the option of overriding KARL and
implementing an action against KARL's recommendations. However,
the consequence of thus failing to conform was to receive another
message. KARL did not know how to concede; in short, KARL was a
nag.
These problems were remedied in two general ways. First, it
was necessary to inhibit the display of all messages which were
not procedure-oriented. Second, thresholds for prompts were
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incorporated. For example, if a subject failed to comply with
one of KARL's suggestions, KARL did not make the same suggestion
again for five time units. As another example, "hysteresis" was
introduced into the situation assessment thresholds to avoid the
aforementioned problem of borderline conditions.
An experiment was conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of
KARL as an assistant. Two general issues were of interest:
1) the feasibility of adapting a rule-based system (which was not
originally designed as an aid) to support human problem solving,
and 2) the effects of an online coach upon humans' performance.
METHOD
Subjects
Junior and senior undergraduates at Georgia Institute of
Technology served as paid volunteer subjects. All eight of them
were majors in industrial and systems engineering, and had
completed courses in physics, dynamics, calculus, and
differential equations.
Experimental Procedure
The experimental procedure in this experiment was almost
identical to that used in the research described earlier (Morris,
1983; Morris & Rouse, 1984a). Training provided to subjects in
this experiment was equal to the group receiving instruction in
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both principles and procedures in the earlier experiment, with
the exception that aiding was available.
Subjects served in a total of 13 sessions each, with the
average length of each session being approximately 60 to 75
minutes. Generally, training was accomplished during the first
eight sessions, in which subjects read instructional materials
and practiced controlling PLANT. A discussion of principles
governing PLANT was provided during session 3, and operational
procedures were made available for the first time in session 5.
KARL was used as an online coach during sessions 5-8, and
supplied the three types of aiding information described earlier.
Sessions 9-13 were considered experimental sessions, in that
no further instruction was provided by the experimenter, and no
questions from subjects were answered. As with the earlier
experiment, unfamiliar situations (i.e., a tank rupture and a
safety system failure) were introduced in sessions 10 and 12,
which were counterbalanced across subjects. The coach did not
provide guidance in following procedures during sessions 9-12;
subjects received only information related to situation
assessment and overall performance feedback. No information from
the coach was available during session 13« At the end of session
13, subjects completed a paper-and-pencil test of knowledge about
PLANT and the coach, based upon material contained in the written
instructions.
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RESULTS
In order to assess the effects of aiding, the performance of
subjects in this experiment was compared via analysis of variance
to performance of the group receiving both principles and
procedures in the earlier PLANT research. (In the following
presentation, these groups are referred to as the aided and
unaided group, respectively.) Thus, performance measures were
used as dependent variables in two-way analyses with one
between-subjects factor (aiding) and one within-subjects factor
(session).
As with the earlier research, the experimental manipulation
had no significant effect upon total production achieved,
although the mean for the aided group was slightly higher (34.4.6
vs. 320.2 units of production per time unit). There was also no
significant effect of aiding on the number of automatic valve
trips experienced (an indication of PLANT stability). However,
as with total production, the mean for the aided group was
slightly better (i.e., lower) (0.497 vs. 0.605 trips per time
unit).
Aiding also failed to have a significant effect upon another
measure of PLANT stability: variance of fluid levels in the
system. Once again, the trend was in the expected direction, in
that the mean for the aided group was lower (12.44 vs. 15.27).
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Two performance measures were significantly affected by
aiding. Aided subjects kept a higher percentage of valves open
(92% vs. 87%, £ < .04), and generally maintained a higher level
of input into the system (116.8 vs. 106.9 units per time unit,
JD < .04). The practical significance of these results is
presented later.
Assessing subjects' performance during unfamiliar
situations, there was no effect of aiding upon subjects' repair
of the tank rupture (15 of the 16 subjects did so). However, it
was found that seven out of eight subjects in the aided group
repaired the unfamiliar failure of the PLANT safety system,
whereas only three of the eight unaided subjects found that
failure. This difference in proportions was found to be
statistically significant (£ < .04).
Differences in scores on the test of PLANT knowledge were
examined. Although overall scores did not differ significantly,
it was found that the aided group scored significantly higher on
the section of the test related to dynamic principles (83% vs.
69%, £ < .05).
Finally, the actions selected by subjects were compared to
actions which would have been selected by KARL in the same
situation. This comparison was similar to that reported for the
earlier experiment (Knaeuper, 1983; Knaeuper & Rouse, 1984).
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There was no significant difference in the degree to which
actions chosen by aided and unaided subjects agreed with those
selected by KARL.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
As noted in the introduction, this research was prompted by
two issues: 1) the feasibility of adapting a rule-based model as
an online coach, and 2) the effects of such asistance upon
subjects' ability to control PLANT. With regard to the second
issue, none of the statistically significant effects the coach
had upon subjects' performance were related to primary
performance measures. Although mean performance for the aided
group was better with all measures, the only significant effects
of aiding were upon the secondary performance measures of number
of open valves and level of system input. These measures
indicate that subjects did what they were told to do. Although
all subjects (in this research and in the earlier experiment)
were instructed to keep all valves open and maintain a relatively
high level of input and output, apparently the coach's presence
caused them to follow these instructions more closely.
Whereas it is fairly easy to provide an explanation for
subjects' following instructions more closely, explaining why
more subjects in the aided group were able to diagnose the safety
system failure is not as straightforward. Three possibilities
are suggested by the data. First, since failure of the safety
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system resulted in automatic closing of valves at random, the
ability to maintain more valves open in general may have assisted
subjects in detecting the presence of an unusual situation. Once
detected, it should have been easy to determine that the cause of
the unusual situation was failure of the safety system, since
only two unusual failures were possible.
Judging from the available evidence, however, it is
difficult to imagine that this is a sufficient account of what
happened. A look at the performance of all subjects supplied
with procedures in the earlier experiment conducted by Morris
(i.e., those with procedures only, and those with both procedures
and principles) reveals that there was no difference in the
number of valves kept open by persons who repaired the safety
system and those who did not (89% vs. 88%). Additionally, a
subsequent examination of logs kept by the unaided group during
the time the safety system had failed indicated that at least six
of the eight people felt that something was wrong; yet, only
three of these successfully diagnosed the failure, and the others
attributed the problem to deficiencies in their control actions.
Another possible explanation may be found in the fact that
the aided group scored significantly higher on the test of
information related to dynamic principles. Perhaps an increased
knowledge of the functioning of the system enabled the aided
group to diagnose the unfamiliar failure. This explanation also
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seems inadequate. There was no difference in the test scores of
unaided subjects who repaired the safety system and those who did
not (69.3% vs. 69.2%).
The third explanation for aided subjects' success in
diagnosing the failure of the safety system is that somehow
providing them with the coach made the difference. During the
session in which the safety system failed, two types of aiding
messages were provided: situation assessment and performance
feedback. The situation assessment consisted of informing
subjects which procedure, if any, applied. There were no
messages such as "unfamiliar situation". Performance feedback
was related to changes in the stability of the system. When the
safety system failed, it is possible that subjects received
conflicting messages, such as "No procedure applicable" and
"Instability extreme". Apparent conflict such as this may have
served as a cue that something was wrong, and could have
suggested to subjects that the problems in the system were not
the result of poor control actions.
These ideas about the role of the coach in the unfamiliar
situation are purely conjecture at this point. It seems likely
that a combination of all of these factors (i.e., increased
system stability, knowledge of the functioning of the system, and
assistance in situation assessment) contributed to subjects'
success. An understanding of factors affecting the human's
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ability to deal with an unfamiliar event could have important
theoretical and practical implications, and further investigation
of this issue is warranted.
Finally, another question arises with regard to the results
of this research: Why did aided subjects score higher on the
test of dynamic principles? Since the primary difference in the
way the two groups were treated was the presence or absence of
the online coach, it would appear that this was the reason for
the difference in the test scores. This is counterintuitive,
however, because the focus of the aiding was on following
procedures, and not on understanding the functioning of the
system. Therefore, interpretation of this result must be delayed
until the research can be replicated, using a larger number of
subjects and controlling for potential differences in abilities.
Considering the feasibility of adapting a rule-based model
as an online coach, this research has served to emphasize the
complexities and subtleties of model-based online aiding and
training. As noted by other researchers (Clancey & Lestinger,
1982; Jackson & Lefrere, 1984), answering the questions of what
advice and feedback to provide, as well as when they should be
provided, is far from straightforward. This point is
particularly supported by the results reported here where
subjects benefited along several dimensions by having an online
coach, but did not become more like the coach in the process
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(i.e., there was no increase in agreement between the subjects'
and model's choices of actions). Thus, the results of being
coached can be more than, or at least other than, simply gaining
the coach's expertise. This has profound implications for the
current view of "expert systems" as a panacea for training and
aiding.
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